

Popper Letters

2002

Vol.14, No.1.

日本ポパー哲学研究会事務局

(2002年8月号)

CONTENTS

〈Karl Popper 2002 特集号〉

KP2002 ひとつの報告	小河原 誠	1
マスグレーヴ事件：批判的合理主義の観点から	立花 希一	2
Workshop: CRITICAL RATIONALISM IN JAPAN		4
Popper in Japan: Falsche Freunde und falsche Feinde? Oder Überwindung des Freund-Feind-Denkens	萩原 能久	5
Comments on Some Works of the Late Professor Saburo Ichii	小河原 誠	8
JAPAN IS STILL A TRIBAL CLOSED SOCIETY AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSPLANT CRITICAL RATIONALISM IN IT	立花 希一	11

〈一般セッション参加論文〉

IS FIDEISM JUST REDUNDANT FOR CRITICAL RATIONALISM?	小柳 昌司	15
SURREPTITIOUS CHANGES IN JAPAN: AN EXAMPLE	立花 希一	20

〈参加者より〉

ポパー解釈に吹く現代ヨーロッパの風	山下 孝子	23
Karl Popper 2002 Centenary Congress に参加して	松元 雅和	24

〈2002年研究大会案内〉

日本ポパー哲学研究会第13回年次大会のお知らせ		25
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(Karl Popper 2002 特集号)



KP2002 ひとつの報告

小河原 誠 (北里大学)

7月3日から7日まで、ウィーン大学でカール・ポパーの生誕100年を記念する国際学会がウィーン大学およびカール・ポパー研究所などの共催であり、遠路いとわず、出席してきた。(実質的な実行委員長とも言うべき人物はディヴッド・ミラー氏)。会議はじつに盛大。参加者は国にして50カ国を超えると聞いた。初日は、午後6時から市のラートハウスで同時通訳つきのレセプションがあった。当初予定されていたヘルムート・シュミット元ドイツ首相は欠席、アンソニー・クイントン卿は入院中(肺炎)のため姿を見せられなかった。市長の挨拶につづく一連の催しの中には、映画の上映があった。ただし、超短編とでも言うべきもので、残存しているフィルムや写真などをつなぎ合わせたもの。アルプバッハ・フォーラムの情景やコンラート・ローレンツとの炉辺談話で快活そうにしている場面、また彼と一緒に散歩している風景などが心に残った。(いっしょに参加された慶応大学の萩原能久教授がなんとか入手のてだてを講じてみたいとおっしゃっておられた。)つづいて、「カール・ポパー 人と作品に寄せて」という題目のもとで、元厚生相のフランツ・クロイツァーの司会の下で、ハンス・アルパートや物理学者のヘルマン・ボンディ卿などを囲むシンポジウムがつづいたが、筆者は到着したばかりでもあり疲労感があったので、早々に退席した。

さて、翌4日から本格的に始まった学会は、基本的に朝の8時半から昼休み2時間を挟んで5時40分までつづき、さらに催し物や特別部門の発表がつづくというものだから、まじめに参加しているとかかなりハードなものとなる。時間割としては、7部門にくわえて特別部門が同時並行で進んだうえに、1部門内でも2セッションが並行するという状況が半分以上あった。どうやってもすべての発表を聞くことは不可能。いま手許のタイム・テーブルから数えると、発表者は230名程度はいたようである。ゲスト講演者でない、いわばひらの発表者は質問時間などを含めて持ち時間30分。1セッションは4名くらいのペースで進行した。アブストラクト集をみると、ひとりA4の紙1枚なのだが、なんと281ページに達している。目次や索引のページを差し引いても、ざっと延べにして250名程度の提出者がいたことになる。

さて、7部門というのは、「物理学(物理科学)の

哲学」、「生物学の哲学」、「社会科学の哲学」、「道徳および政治哲学」、「論理学および方法論」、「認識論および形而上学、カール・ポパーの生涯と時代」であり、各部門には各3名の招待講演者が招かれ、1時間半ほどのセッションがもたれた。ただし、当初予定されていたマイケル・レッドヘッド(邦訳著書『不完全性・非局所性・実在主義 量子力学の哲学序説』)とジョン・メイナード・スミス(京都賞受賞者)の二氏が病気のために出席できないということで、講演者は別な方になった。

日本からの発表は、第3部門と第4部門であった。第4部門で、秋田大学教授の立花氏、京都大学助手の小柳昌司氏(目下ミラー教授のもとに留学中)、そして第三部門でヨーク大学大学院の吉田敬氏の発表があった。立花氏の発表(*Surreptitious Changes in Japan: an Example*)は、その内容からしてアジア系の研究者のみならず、多くの参加者から多数のコメントが寄せられた。戦後日本の政治意識を考える上で、貴重な視座が提出されたと思う。小柳氏の発表(*Is Fideism just Redundant for Critical Rationalism?*)は批判的合理主義の核心にかかわる論究であり、ポパーの元助手であったシャーマー氏が非常に高く評価されていた。じっさい、よくまとめられていたと思うし、プレゼンテーションも見事であった。吉田氏の発表(*Rationality and other Cultures*)は、きびしいコメントを招き寄せ、ただちに質問者との個人的な討論に移っていった。

特別部門には、ポパー哲学の核心にかかわるものから周辺のなまでのいろいろなテーマがくまれていた。筆者は出席できなかったが、面白そうなものにボンディ卿とカンピッツ教授による「自然および社会科学へのカール・ポパーの認識論の意義」(7時から8時半)とか、「オーストリアにおけるカール・ポパー」、「ラカトシュおよびポパー再訪」、「新カンタベリー物語」といったものがあった。日本ポパー哲学研究会は、この部門で「*Critical Rationalism in Japan*」というシンポジウムをおこなった。千葉大学の嶋津格教授の司会のもとで、秋田大学の立花希一教授(*JAPAN IS STILL A TRIBAL CLOSED SOCIETY AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSPLANT CRITICAL RATIONALISM IN IT*)、小河原(*Comments on Some Works of the Late Professor Saburo Ichii*)、慶応大学の萩原能久教授(*Popper in Japan: Falsche Freunde und falsche Feinde? Oder Überwindung des Freund-Feind-Denkens*)の順で発表がおこなわれ、質疑応答をもった。テーマからして、専門的研究の水準を提示するというよりも、日本社会と批判的合理主義のかかわりが中心になったのは当然。準備不足を認めなかったにもかかわらず、この国で批判的合理主義を研究することの意義の一端を国際的な舞台

ポパー・コンGRESSに参加する前、私は次のような期待をしていた。ポパー・コンGRESSには主として、世界各国の批判的合理主義者たちが集まってくるであろう。その会議では、相互に批判的な議論が活発に行われ、実り豊かな成果が得られるであろうと。この期待は、ほぼ当たったといつてよい。**Surreptitious Changes in Japan: An Example** という私の発表に対しても、多くの参加者から、さまざまな視点からの批判、示唆、助言をいただいた。W.バークソン（アメリカ）等は、帰国後も電子メールで意見を寄せてくれた。また、各国の批判的合理主義者と友人になれたことも本当に得難い貴重な収穫であった。バークソンはもちろんのこと、S.リッチモンド（カナダ）、J.ヴェッテルシュテン（ドイツ）、S.ガティ（イタリア）、N.ラオール（イスラエル）、等々。J.J.ユアン（台湾）は、ホイリゲの席で、酔った勢いでか、恩師、アガシを台湾に招待すると約束していたが、かれからの電子メールによるとすぐにも実現しそうである。実現したら、アガシに会いに台湾に行けるかもしれない。H.G.リー（韓国）とは、今夏、たまたま韓国に行くことになったので、ソウルで再会する約束をした。韓国にもポパー哲学研究会を設立するように働きかけ、日韓の相互交流ができるようになればと思っている。

さて、先に「ほぼ当たった」としか書けなかったのは、ショッキングな事件——期待に反する、まさに反証事例ともいふべきもの——に遭遇したからである。

この事件は、7月7日、11時からマスグレーヴ、シュラムの二人によるセッション（第6セッション：認識論と形而上学のセッションの一つ）中に起きた。

マスグレーヴの発表が終わり、質疑応答の時間になると、アガシが真っ先に手を挙げ、最初の質問者となった。アガシは、次のような質問をした。あなたは、検証された理論の「受容（acceptance）」というが、ポパーによれば、検証された理論を信じるのが合理的であるという意味ではない。ポパーの『科学的発見の論理』には、「その理論をさらにもっと続けて批判にさらし、われわれに考案できる最も厳しいテストにかけるに値するものとして選んだという意味においてだけである」と書かれていると言って、引用箇所をページ数まで述べた。突然、マスグレーヴは、「ラビッシュ（rubbish）」と大声で怒鳴った。アガシが続けて何か言おうとすると、またもや「ラビッシュ」と怒鳴りつけた。人が「キレル」というのはこういうことなのかかもしれない。このような光景を目にしたのは初めてであった。しかも、国際学会という場で。私は唾然とした。次に、シュラムの発表、質疑応答が行われたが、マスグレーヴもアガシもいっさい発言をしなかった。マスグレーヴは会場を出ていったのかとすら思っ

たが、最後までいたようである。批判的合理主義者が必ずしも、批判的合理主義を実践するとは限らないが、マスグレーヴの言動は、あまりにも、批判的合理主義とはかけ離れていた。

セッションの直後、アガシと立ち話をする機会があったので、「マスグレーヴの反応には失望した」というと、「私がかれをヒット（hit）したからだ」と答え、かれの態度をまったく意に介していなかった（この「ヒット」という言葉は意味深長である）。アガシは続けて「ポパーは帰納の問題を否定的に解決したのに、マスグレーヴは、ポパーが検証によって帰納の問題を肯定的に解決したと考えている。これが誤りだ」と言った。実質的な議論としては、まさにここがポイントだと思う。この問題を巡って議論がなされなかったのはひじょうに残念であった（現在、ポパー研究会の仲間の一部で、帰納の問題について電子メールでのやりとりが続いているが、D.Deutsch の *The Fabric of Reality*、邦訳、ドイツ語、『世界の究極理論は存在するか』、朝日新聞社が興味深い）。

アガシは、「批判が尊敬の表明」であることを強調するが、「言うは易く、行うは難し」で、批判を歓迎、許容することはやはり人間心理としてはひじょうに難しいものだというを痛感した。一定の地位を築き、一流と認められている学者の間ではさらに困難なのだろう。当然かもしれないが、西洋人にも面子というものがあるようだ。

この事件は、コンGRESS参加者の間にかかなりの波紋を呼んだ。いろいろな場面で私が会った人はこの事件を話題にした。「あのセッションにいたかい？」というのが最初の挨拶の言葉にすらなった。「マスグレーヴの態度はあまりにも粗野（rude）だ」とか、「これでマスグレーヴの学者としての生命は終わった」とすらコメントする人もいた。「人間はかっとするところもあるが、それをコントロールしなければならない。少なくとも、心が落ち着いたところで、謝罪すべきだった」という人もいた。

さて、その日の夜、小河原さん、萩原さん、小柳さんは、ポパーのお墓参りに出かけた。死者の冥福を祈ることは心の問題であり、いつでもどこでもできるというのが私の信念なので、同行せず、アガシ、ジャーヴィなど十数人の研究者（現在、ジャーヴィの助手をしている吉田君もいた）と会食した。たまたま私の左隣りに座ったのが、G.アンダーソンだった（何度かメールのやりとりはしたことがあるが、会うのは初めてだった）。他人のやり方を真似して、「マスグレーヴのセッションにいたかい？」と真っ先に尋ねると、出席していたという。そこで、どう思うかと尋ねたところ、かれは「アガシの質問は批判的合理主義者がやる

べき質問ではない」と答えた。不意をつかれた思いがした。その理由は次のようなものであった。ポパーどこで何を言ったかなどあまり重要ではない。マスグレーヴは、帰納の実践的問題を解こうとして、自分の理論を提出している。この理論自体に対してアガシは質問、批判すべきであった。司会者がこの方向で仲裁に入れば、議論は実り豊かなものになっていたかもしれない。それが残念だと。このコメントはとても理に当たっていた。当初の私の反応にも問題があることに気づかされた。この後、われわれの会話は、検証の意義の問題に移っていったが、ここでは割愛する（アンダーソンは、科学の合理性にとって反証可能性は必要だが、十分ではない、検証がどうしても必要だと主張したことだけ指摘しておきたい。かれは、批判的合理主義者の中の検証主義者だったのだ）。

右隣りに座っていたジャーヴィがわれわれの会話に入ってきた。かれは、そのセッションには参加していなかったが、あちこちで話題になっているので、事情を聞かせて欲しいという。すると、アンダーソンは、では、状況を客観的に説明しようと言って、しばらく詳しい説明を述べた後、アガシの質問に対してマスグレーヴは、「ラビッシュ、ラビッシュ、ラビッシュ」と怒鳴ったと言った。そこで、私は、3回言ったっけ？ 2回じゃなかった？ とちゃちゃを入れると、そうだ、2回だったとただちに訂正した。すると、ジャーヴィは、「客観的な説明といわれるものにも間違いがあるんだね」と言って笑った。まさに、客観的な説明というのは難しいものである。ジャーヴィは、自分は参加していなかったから、どちらの味方にもならないと、かれの右隣りの人（名前は聞かなかった）に強調していたが、私は無意識にアガシの肩をもっていたのだ。

しばらくして、アガシが後ろに立って、話に加わった。あのマスグレーヴ問題、検証問題で、アンダーソンと私とでは意見が違うのだという、「それはすばらしい（fine）。議論を楽しみなさい」と言った。先のアンダーソンによる手厳しいコメントを話したところ、アガシは次のように答えた。「私があの質問をしたのは、マスグレーヴが発表の最初のところで、次のような主張をしたからだ。ポパーは、自分自身の哲学を理解していなかった。創造者が自分の創造物を正しく理解するとは限らない。自分こそがポパー哲学の正しい理解者だと。だから、私はポパーの本を引用したのだ。この箇所をどう理解するのかと尋ねたのだ。かれはただ単に自分の理論を提出したわけではない」と。

この観点からすると、アンダーソンのコメントが全面的に正しいとはいいきれなくなるだろう。アガシの質問は、マスグレーヴの主張の一部に対する適切な批判になっていたのだ。マスグレーヴとアガシのラビッ

シュ事件は、ポパーとヴィトゲンシュタインの火かき棒事件のように尾ひれがつき、さまざまな解釈、誤解、曲解を生んでいくのかもしれない。しかし、少なくとも、アンダーソンのような冷静な分析、批判的態度は見倣うべきだと思う。また、立場の異なる者の中で、共通の事柄や問題について議論し、しかもそれを楽しむ（enjoy）ゆとりをもちたいものである。



Workshop

CRITICAL RATIONALISM IN JAPAN: On the applicability of Popper's social philosophy to the non-Western world and the possibility of a dialogue among civilizations

(organized by the Japan Popper Society)

SUMMARY

One of the main questions posed in this workshop is: 'To what extent can Popper's social philosophy be considered universally applicable?' Is his ideal of an 'open society', as is often criticized, an Eurocentric one, one that could only flourish under some fortunate conditions of Western democracies? Is the validity of his critical rationalism restricted to a relatively narrow domain? In attempting to answer these questions, it might be helpful to look at how Popper's philosophy was introduced and received in Japan, a non-communist country, though a country where Marxism has traditionally been dominant within the confines of the ivory tower.

This approach may also lead us to consider another question, one that addresses the problem related to the 9.11 attacks. Since then, the term 'clash of civilizations' has gained considerable currency and the very fact that it has seems to be having an impact on world politics. So long as the world is seen to be divided into the civilized nations and the barbaric terrorists, us and them, there seems little hope of preventing the revival of the Friend-Enemy thinking. It is thus all the more imperative to consider the possibility of a dialogue of civilizations, and it seems that Popper's social philosophy would provide useful hints as to how this ought to be pursued.

Prof. Hagiwara will report on the activities of Japan Popper Society during the past decade. He and Prof. Shimazu will also outline some of the distinctive features surrounding the reception of Popper in Japan. Prof. Kogawara will present a paper on the life and work of a Japanese critical rationalist, Saburo Ichii, who pursued somewhat unconventionally the possibility of philosophical thinking in everyday life. Prof. Tachibana will talk about the misinterpretation of Popper's critical rationalism as conservatism by a Japanese historian, Kentaro Hayashi, who tried to attack the Marxian view of history.



Popper in Japan

Falsche Freunde und falsche Feinde? oder Überwindung des Freund-Feind-Denkens

Yoshihisa Hagiwara
(Keio Univ.)

ここに採録したのはKarl Popper 2002における日本ポパー哲学研究会主催の特別ワークショップCritical Rationalism in Japanのなかで行ったドイツ語での報告である。もともとそこで主張したかったことは、1999年度の研究大会で行い、それを敷衍するかたちで『批判と挑戦』（未来社、2000年）に発表した拙稿「日本におけるポパー政治哲学受容の一側面——その生産的発展のために」と大きく変わるところはない。ポパー哲学に見られるヤヌスの側面、すなわち一方でシュミットばりの「友敵思考」を批判し、拒絶するポパーと、それにもかかわらず、おそらくは無意識に持ち込まれたのであろう、ポパー自身の友敵思考という問題設定がそれである。しかし力点は言うまでもなく、「友敵思考」の克服にある。「フレームワークの神話」という晩期ポパーの論文を「他者理解」の可能性というラディカル・デモクラシー論の深化に資するものとして読むと同時に、「文明の衝突」から「文明間の対話」へという、9.11テロ後の世界を考えるヒントをそこに見いだしたいというのが、本報告で私が意図したことであった。

筆者にとってショックだったのは、ウィーンで開催され、会議言語として英語とドイツ語が公認されていたにもかかわらず、この国際会議では事実上、ドイツ語での報告が排除されていたことである。ほんの10年前と比較しても、想像を絶する変化である。ここまで英語がグローバルスタンダードとして、事実上のリン

ガ・フランカ化されているとするならば、私としてもドイツ語など、かつてラテン語が負わされていた宿命、すなわち一部知識人にも「教養」として通用するにすぎない死語とみなして、今後は英語に切り替えていかざるをえないのだろう。それでも私は懸念する。本報告のなかでも引用しているように、ポパー自身、次のように書いているからである。「文化衝突（これは明らかに不適切な表現であり、本来は「異文化接触」とポパーは言うべきだったと私は思うが）は、もし衝突している文化の一方がみずから普遍的に優越したものとみなすとき、その大なる価値の幾分かを失う。そして他方の文化もそれを認めてしまうとき、いっそうその価値を失う」のである。英語による「文化帝国主義」が、批判的議論が持つ、意見、いや異見の交換という最も重要なその意義を損なうことがないことを祈るのみである。

30 Jahre Popper in Japan: Erfolge und Defizite

Die japanische Popper Gesellschaft zählt heute 113 Mitglieder. An diesem Kongress nehmen 8 davon teil. Sie wurde im Jahr 1989 von einem alten Freund Sir Karls, Prof. Jun'ichi Aomi gegründet, der ein führender Rechtsphilosoph an der Tokyo Univ. und Pionier der Popper-Forschung in Japan war. (Der heute anwesende Präsident unserer Popper Gesellschaft, Herr Prof. Shimazu ist ein ehemaliger eifriger Schüler von Prof. Aomi. Er wird Ihnen, meine Damen und Herren, Prof. Aomi später noch aus einem ganz anderen Blickwinkel näherbringen.)

Prof. Aomi, der gleich nach der Gründung der japanischen Popper Gesellschaft zum ersten Präsidenten gewählt wurde, schrieb in der Broschüre 'Popper Letters' über das Ziel der Popper Gesellschaft folgendermaßen:

„Der kritische Rationalismus von Popper muß wörtlich kritisch geprüft und akzeptiert werden. Die Aufgabe unserer Gesellschaft liegt deshalb darin, den Platz anzubieten, wo alle Mitglieder aus diesem Standpunkt her den Gedanken Poppers studieren und miteinander kooperativ betreiben, aber doch nicht als Mitläufer, ihre eigene Forschungen in der kritischen Haltung treiben können“.

Die allgemeine Reaktion im japanischen Akademismus auf unsere Gesellschaft war am Anfang nicht so freundlich. Man fand es sehr merkwürdig, für einen, damals noch Lebenden, eine Gesellschaft zu stiften. Es war nicht zu Unrecht, wenn einige böse Zungen unsere Gesellschaft als 'Popper Fan Club' oder 'Popperische Kirche' betrachteten, obwohl die Mehrzahl der Mitglieder sich selbst lieber nicht als 'Popperianer' bezeichnen wollten. In seinen Begrüßungsworten zur Gründung der japanischen Popper

Gesellschaft brachte Popper selbst seine Verlegenheit zum Ausdruck:

(Ich übersetze aus dem englischen Text. Den originalen, autographischen, englischen Text finden Sie auf unserer Internet Homepage.)

„Ich fühle, daß es mir an intellektueller Bescheidenheit fehlt, wenn ich irgendeine 'Popper Gesellschaft' billige und willkommen heiße. Auf der anderen Seite gebe ich zu, daß es offenbar ein Bedürfnis nach einer solchen Gesellschaft geben mag. Bedürfnis nach Debatte (in einer disziplinierten Weise und nicht über die Worte) ist nämlich sehr groß. Und dieses Bedürfnis mag mein alter Freund Prof. Aomi gefühlt haben“.

Popper hat recht. Denn Prof. Aomi hatte tatsächlich ein großes Bedürfnis nach Debatte. Er war ein bekannter, erklärter Antimarxist in Japan, in einem nicht kommunistischen Staat, wo der Einfluß des Marxismus nichtsdestotrotz zumindest im Elfenbeinturm dominant war. Mit diesem Hintergrund publizierte Prof. Aomi im Jahr 1973 sein Buch „Rehabilitation des Rationalismus – Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen“, in dem Aufsätze gesammelt wurden, die mitten in der Periode der weltweiten Studentenrevolte geschrieben wurden und bei denen er sich dabei auf Popper, Russel, Kelsen, Topitsch und logischen Positivisten wie T.D. Werldon berief, um vor allem neomarxistische Lehren hegelianischer Abstammung hart zu attackieren.

Debatte oder Kritik ist normalerweise keine angenehme Sache. Härteste Kritik kann uns helfen, das gemeinsame Ziel zu erreichen, wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt voranzutreiben und zu unseren aktuellen Problemen Lösungen zu finden. Voraussetzung ist allerdings, daß alle Teilnehmer davon ausgehen, daß Kritik nicht persönlicher Natur ist, bzw. keine feindliche Absicht dahinter steht. Aber schiefgegangene Debatten führen nur dazu, die Teilnehmer in freundliche und feindliche Lager zu spalten. Genau das geschah leider in Japan, worauf ich später nochmals zurückkommen werde.

War Popper ein Freund des logischen Positivismus, auch wenn man hier die Problematik des Freund-Feind-Denkens nicht in Frage stellt? Definitiv nicht! Es ist heute jedem Popper-Forscher bekannt, daß Popper von Anfang an ein erklärter Gegner des logischen Positivismus des Wiener Kreises war. War seine Kritik an Marxismus logischer Natur? Ist die Theorie des Marxismus deshalb zu verwerfen, weil sie vom logischen Standpunkt her nicht 'falsifizierbar' ist? Diese Frage kann man mit „Ja“ und „Nein“ beantworten. Meines Erachtens ging der Popperische Gedanke, nicht nur seine Sozialphilosophie, sondern auch seine Wissenschafts-

theorie davon aus, diejenige anthropologische Tatsache kritisch zu akzeptieren, daß wir, die Menschen, so feig sind, daß wir Fehlbarkeit unserer Vernunft nicht hinnehmen können und uns dogmatisch jeglicher Kritik zu entziehen versuchen. So neigen wir dazu, autoritär unsere eigene Position zu festigen. Die Menschen sind schwach. Da Popper gerade diese menschliche, allzu menschliche Tatsache einsah, versuchte er, zumindest von den Wissenschaften, mit Hilfe seiner methodologisch genialen Konzeption, solche eine dogmatische Einstellung wegzunehmen. Sein Anspruch auf Falsifizierbarkeit einer Theorie oder auf Falsifikation als praktische Pflicht der Wissenschaftler scheint mir nur ein Mittel zu diesem Zwecke zu sein. Seine Marxismuskritik war deshalb an eine Theorie gerichtet, die für alles Geschehene, auch Widersprüchliches, die Richtigkeit seiner eigenen Theorie untermauert. Sie war die moralische Kritik an einer unehrlichen Einstellung, etwaige Diskussionen zu vermeiden, um nicht eigene Lieblingstheorie zu gefährden. (Albert nannte später diese dogmatische Einstellung zutreffend 'Immunisierungs-strategie'.) Sie war auch gegen solche Art des Wissens gerichtet, die „gerade zur Pflicht machte, das Leben eines anderen Menschen aufgrund eines unkritisch angenommenen Dogmas – einer >Ideologie< – in Gefahr zu bringen“. (AP, 42)

Versucht man von diesem Standpunkt her das gesamte Gedankenbild Poppers neu zu interpretieren, so kann man hier einen Ansatz finden, sich über die verschiedenen Varianten des Rechtfertigungsdenkens im Rationalismus der Moderne zu reflektieren. In diesem Sinne könnte sich die Popperische Philosophie sogar als eine attraktive Alternative zur Philosophie der Postmoderne darstellen. Bei uns in Japan hat man diese Chance verabsäumt, da dort immer die Tendenz vorherrschte, Vorzüge der Philosophie Poppers gegenüber anderen Denkrichtungen nur im eigenen Freundeslager, selbstgerecht bestätigt zu bekommen.

So war es kein Wunder, daß Popper und seine Philosophie potenzielle Freunde verloren, und sie ins gegnerische Lager trieben. Ein typisches Beispiel dafür war der Fall von Masao Maruyama. Ein anderes Beispiel wäre vielleicht Saburo Ichii gewesen, über den Ihnen Herr Prof. Kogawara später erzählen wird. Ichii war am Anfang Logiker und Wissenschaftstheoretiker, übersetzte >das Elend des Historizismus< ins Japanische, entwickelte seinen eingenen japanischen kritischen Rationalismus in den 60er Jahren und bezog eine neue Position. Aber nun zurück zu Maruyama.

Kritik von Maruyama an Popper

Masao Maruyama war zweifellos die führende Figur im Nachkriegs-Japan. Er hat einerseits als Politologe wichtige Veröffentlichungen gemacht, wie „Denken in Japan“ und „Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japan“, aber seine Tätigkeit war nicht auf die enge akademische Sphäre begrenzt. Er war ein aktiver Pazifist und hat sehr oft die Tonangeberrolle bei der Bildung öffentlicher Meinungen gespielt.

Philosophisch war Maruyama ein Neu-Kantianer und er stand vor allem unter dem starken Einfluß von Max Weber und Karl Mannheim. Da ich in diesem kurzen Bericht nicht eingehend über die Bedeutung seines Werkes sprechen kann, möchte ich nur seine, eher kaltschnäuzige, Kritik an Popper erwähnen.

Solange es sich um Wissenschaftstheorie handelt, stimmt Maruyama Popper generell zu, aber er bezweifelt die Methode seiner Geschichtsschreibung.

„Popper betont; Geschichte habe keinen Sinn und wir geben ihr den Sinn. Aber diese sinngebenden Subjekte, also wir selbst, leben in einer historischen Situation der Gegenwart. Wir sind die Menschen, die täglich von der Geschichte produziert werden, während wir sie produzieren“. Kurz gesagt, „Popper versteht das Problem und die Qual der Geschichtlichkeit des Geschichtserzählers überhaupt nicht“. War diese Kritik von Maruyama zutreffend? Übersah Popper wirklich das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Geschichtserzählers?

Ich glaube, daß Maruyama diese Kritik zurückgenommen hätte, wenn er die Drei-Welten-Theorie von Popper, die die Menschen und die Welt als Produkte und zugleich als Produzierende begreifen läßt, eingehender studiert hätte. Welt 1 produziert Welt 2, und diese Welt 2 produziert wiederum Welt 3. Hingegen verbessert Welt 3 durch Welt 2 die Welt 1. Diese Popperische Konzeption könnte man sogar als eine Erweiterung der Gedanken Marx' und Engels, wie sie in „der deutschen Ideologie“ beschrieben werden, „Menschen machten Geschichte, aber ohne Bewußtsein“ auf den gesamten Lebensprozeß anwenden.

Maruyama hat offensichtlich aufgehört, nach den 60er Jahren Popper zu lesen, obwohl er selbst in mehreren Schriften von der Popperischen Grundidee der offenen und geschlossenen Gesellschaft Gebrauch gemacht hat.

Wer war Schuld daran? Warum wurde der kritische Rationalismus von Popper bei uns in Japan als altmodische, schon lange überwundene Philosophie betrachtet? Wenn irgendetwas bei uns schief gegangen ist, dann hat es sicherlich damit zu tun, daß unser kritischer

Rationalismus nicht einmal versucht hat, eine Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns aufzustellen, obwohl er die Methode der kritischen Diskussion hervorhob. Der japanische kritische Rationalismus bewertete die Philosophie der Postmoderne als obskur und lehnte sie als Großsprecherei kategorisch ab. Unser kritischer Rationalismus hat verabsäumt, über aktuelle Probleme sehr potentielle Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Popperischen Gedanken auszuschöpfen. Der japanische kritische Rationalismus hat sich an der Orthodoxie von Popper festgehalten, obwohl Popper selbst das Orthodoxiedenken als Tod des Wissens betrachtete, denn er glaubte, daß das Wachstum des Wissens völlig von der Existenz der Nichtübereinstimmung abhing (MF, 34).

Das Problem des Anderen und des Zusammenpralls von Zivilisationen bei Popper

Hiermit möchte ich zum Schluß einige Beispiele geben, wo man die Aktualität der Philosophie Poppers am besten findet. In einer Abhandlung „the Myth of the Framework“, also im „Mythos des Rahmens“ thematisiert Popper wieder die Bedeutung der kritischen Diskussion, aber aus einer etwas anderen Sicht als früher. Dort betont Popper, daß die Bedeutung der Diskussion nicht darin liegt, zu irgendeinem Konsens zu kommen, sondern lediglich darin besteht, zu entdecken, wo man nicht übereinstimmen kann. In diesem Fall „stehen wir vor einer unüberbrückbaren Kluft. Jedoch selbst in diesem Fall besteht kaum Zweifel, daß beide Parteien, durch diese Erfahrungen zutiefst getroffen, Neues gelernt haben“ (MF, 36).

Diese Ansicht von Popper ist, meines Erachtens, aus zwei politophilosophischen Gründen äußerst wichtig. Erstens, sie kann zur Weiterbildung der sogenannten „Radikalen-Demokratie-Theorie“ beitragen, die über das Problem der Anderen und Fremden in unserer Gesellschaft angemessene Lösungen geben will. Die Frage von Habermas, wie die Anderen in unsere Gemeinschaft einbezogen werden sollen, etwa wie wir Ausländern Bürgerrechte geben, sollte nach Popper ganz anders gestellt werden. Die Frage muß so lauten: Wie können wir unseren Horizont gemeinsam mit den Anderen erweitern, ohne daß diese nachgeben und ihre Andersheit aufgeben müssen.

Mein zweiter Punkt gewann nach dem 11. Sep. eine besondere Aktualität: Die Frage nach dem Zusammenprall von Zivilisationen (clash of civilizations), bzw. inwieweit ist ein Dialog zwischen den Zivilisationen möglich? Popper schrieb in der erwähnten Abhandlung: „für mich implizierten diese Erfahrungen, daß der Zusammenprall der

Kulturen einige seiner großen Werte verlieren kann, wenn nämlich eine der aufeinanderstoßenden Kulturen sich generell überlegen fühlt. Umso mehr, wenn dies von der anderen Kultur ebenso betrachtet wird. Dies kann den größten Wert der kulturellen Auseinandersetzung zerstören, da dieser auf der Tatsache beruht, eine kritische Haltung hervorbringen zu können“ (MF, 51).

Gerade deshalb müssen wir die menschliche Schwäche, die uns zum ominösen, katastrophalen Freund-Feind-Denken verführt, immer im Auge behalten. In seiner „Open Society“ hat Popper geschrieben:

Unsere >natürliche< Reaktion wird darin bestehen, daß wir die Menschheit in Freund und Feind teilen; in jene Menschen, die unserem Stamme, unserer emotionalen Gemeinschaft angehören, und in jene Menschen, die außerhalb dieser Gemeinschaft stehen; in Gläubige und Ungläubige; in Mitbürger und Fremde; in Klassengenossen und Klassenfeinde; und in Führer und Geführte. (OG-II 289-90)
– Aber ich behaupte, daß die Lehre, daß nicht Vernunft, sondern die Liebe herrschen solle, denen Tür und Tor öffnet, die durch Haß regieren. – Ich behaupte, daß kein Gefühl, nicht einmal die Liebe, die Herrschaft von Institutionen ersetzen kann, die von der Vernunft kontrolliert werden. (Ibid., 291)

Ob Popper selbst von diesem Freund-Feind-Denken immer frei war, ist eine andere Frage.



Comments on Some Works of the Late Professor Saburo Ichii

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I would like to speak about the life and work of the late professor Saburo Ichii (1922-1989), who was once a student of Sir Karl Popper in 1950s. He was one of the leading Japanese Popperians and committed to the civil resistance movement especially against the Vietnam War. This movement had strong influences to the non-Marxist activists in 1960s, 70s and 80s. Therefore this movement allowed his thought to have a certain influence to the citizens who want to improve our society. On the other side he gave unique interpretations to the Japanese traditional thoughts and tried to invent a theory that contributes to the improvement of our Japanese society.

It is my aim to attempt to give a consistent interpretation

to his thought and practice. He was certainly a Popperian, and at the same time a political activist and a historian of the Japanese ideas. Without saying, his various activities do not contradict with each other. Rather I believe that we can find there a unity of his thought. And in my opinion, his philosophy as a whole makes clear some insufficiencies in Popper's social and political philosophy.

1 A brief Sketch of his Life and Work

He was born in 1922 in Osaka. It is very important to notice that he experienced the Japan's war (World War II) as a young chemistry student of Osaka Imperial University. During this war, his younger brother lost his life as a kamikaze attacker. Immediately after Japan had been completely defeated in 1945, Ichii clearly realized that he had been wholly deceived by Japanese militarism (fascism). This realization caused him to choose a way to become a philosopher.

I think that his decision to become a philosopher based on his two strong resolutions. His first resolution was such that we should not allow any thought to become arrogant or despotic to other thought. He called such a thought a self-absolutizing type of thought. He thought that there had been a lot of this type of thought in Japanese intellectual history. One of the most glaring examples is, according to him, Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843), an ultranationalistic ideologue of Kokugaku (national studies, or nativism) in the period of Tokugawa. Ichii believed that this type of thought allowed or supported the rise of the Japanese militarism and or ultranationalism. It is here that we can find one of his motives, which led him to the critical study of the history of Japanese ideas. To this point I will return later.

On the other side he thought that we should resist against the irrational way of thinking supported by some Japanese traditional thought. For he thought that the irrational tendencies of the Japanese thought were liable to weaken the resistance of the people against the militarism. He seemed to feel that Japanese people should learn the empirical and rational way of thinking in order to overcome the irrational aspects of the traditional thought. He found a model of rational thinking in the western thought, especially in the philosophy of science. Therefore it seems to me that he tried hard to implant it in our intellectual climate by translating many important books or papers concerning the philosophy of science.

From these two resolutions, I think, we can understand the basic structure or framework of his thought. First resolution was the main motif, which drove him to the study of

the Japanese history of ideas. And the second resolution suggests the reason that he studied western thought and tried to bring it into our country. From his bibliography we can find out a fact that he studied the western thought mainly in 1950s, and after that he slowly changed his main subjects and began to study the Japanese thought. Therefore at first I will try to draw a sketch of some characteristics of his study of western thought.

2 His Struggle against the Dialectics

As I referred to above, after having graduated the university he stepped out from the way of becoming a chemist, and he trained himself for a philosopher by his own efforts. Also in Japan, usually those people who want to be a philosopher or a professional of western philosophies were and are educated in the department of philosophy, and in most cases they were forced or compelled at that time implicitly to study German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel). This implicit tendency was dominant in the prewar period of the Japanese Imperial universities and even in the postwar period did not disappear quickly.

Against this background Ichii's academic career is very outstanding. Some words on this point. Ichii studied mainly Whitehead, Russell, logical positivism, Oxford school of analytical philosophy and Popper. He translated many papers and books concerning the philosophy of science. Besides these works he wrote many papers about the methodology of science on purpose to explain the rational way of thinking to us Japanese. I think that his works were as a whole a challenge to the authority of the Japanese academic philosophies in view of the fact that the Japanese academy was, generally speaking, dominated strongly by German Idealism. In addition to this, his own intellectual background and his study of the mathematical logic are also diametrically opposed to the traditional academicians, Hegelians and Marxist dialecticians. Here it is clear that he decided to criticize and or struggle against the Hegelian or Marxist dialectics because dialectical way of thinking had a harmful influence in the civil resistance movements.

He analyzed the Hegelian dialectics, especially the concept of "contradiction" or "movement" by using mathematical logic, and also analyzed appropriately the dynamic development (growth) of scientific knowledge by relying mainly on Popper's falsificationism. In my opinion his attack to the dialectics was in the main successful and shook severely their methodology and philosophy in the postwar period.

After his attack against the dialectics Ichii changed his

main focus. It is now good time to return to his study of Japanese history of ideas. His urgent concern was concentrated on his own country's problems.

3 Characteristics of his Study of the Japanese History of Ideas

He wrote many papers and books in the field of Japanese history of ideas. But I think that his two main books, that is, *PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'MEIJI RESTORATION'* and *GENEALOGY OF MODERN INOVATIVE THOUGHTS IN JAPAN* are very important. They are both discussing various thoughts of many Japanese political thinkers. Especially his book, *PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'MEIJI RESTRA-TION'* tries to explain the ideological background of the Japan's first attempt of modernization (Opening of the land).

I think that there is no doubt that he carried out his studies with a clear and distinct intention. In the history of Japan he looked for the thoughts, which did not absolutize themselves and which rather tried to resist to the governmental authorities of the time.

I believe that an example will serve to make explicit his way of thinking. He refers to Chikafusa Kitabatake (1293-1354), a political leader in the period of Nanbokuchō. Ichii evaluates him very highly on the reason that he tried to look at the myth of origin or national essence (*kokutai* in Japanese) of our country in a wider perspective and tried to relativize it by pointing out the fact that other countries have also similar myths. He did not fall a prey to the nationalistic worship of his own country. According to Ichii's interpretation, Kitabatake was very acquainted with Confucianism, Buddhism and Shintoism. He asserted that all people of the country including rulers (emperors) and subjects (peasants, common people and so on) equally pertain to the deity, and he also asserted that the ideal politics is in principle same in all the countries (in his time, mainly China and India). Kitabatake also admitted the right of the ruled to revolutionize his own country if the ruler is neither benevolent nor legitimate. This was indeed revolutionary thought because he belonged to the aristocracy by birth. Ichii asserts that Kitabatake clearly realized that there was a kind of implicit covenant between the emperor and the ruled so that even the emperors must be punished in the case of their transgressions. Ichii also pointed out that Kitabatake supported the cultural relativism on the reason that it foments the competition between the various people and consequently can develop their own talents or curiosities.

I think it is now clear what type of thought Ichii liked

and disliked. There is no doubt that he associated with cultural pluralism (eclecticism), political egalitarianism, social contract theory, and the revolutionary thought. On the other hand, he tried to preclude cultural monism and of course the dogmatic ideologies leading to the justification of the political hierarchy and discrimination.

Although Ichii picks up various examples, I think it is unnecessary to refer to them in detail. Rather I should say that Ichii's description makes clear the fact that the Japanese people have attempted continually to improve their own lives and survival conditions even in the period of extreme political oppression, by absorbing Confucianism and Buddhism and their ancestor's autochthonous thought, and of course by developing their own political thought. Ichii found here a hope for our future.

There is no doubt that Ichii maintains eclecticism and cultural pluralism (relativism) and tries to give us a hope that the study of our own traditions can open our eyes to a lot of possibilities of improving our own society.

I think that Ichii's position is not sustainable without a support of Popper's critical pluralism (critical rationalism) according to which it is the severity of criticism that grows up our knowledge and leads us to the maturity. Ichii forgets, it seems me, to discriminate the important difference between critical pluralism on one side and eclecticism in a wrong sense on the other side, and by this failure he did not try to ascertain the social conditions where the critical discussion flourishes. This point is very important because the spirit of discussion is historically weak in Japan, as pointed out by a famous Japanese philosopher of politics, Masao Maruyama, for example. I am afraid that Ichii's eclecticism will fade out into bad relativism, which banishes critical discussion in an authentic sense.

4 Progress and Key-Person in History

From now on I would like to refer to the other aspects of Ichii's thought. His study of the Japanese history of ideas is naturally and necessary based on his strong conviction to ameliorate our own society. Therefore he could not help but discuss the criterion according to which we can judge whether history shows a progress. Here we are led to his philosophy of history. Of course his arguments are enlightened by Popper's arguments especially in the chapter 25 of his *OPEN SOCIETY*. Ichii criticized historicism as Popper did, and believed that it is we that make the history meaningful.

Ichii proposed as a criterion of the progress of the history the reduction of the misery or evil for which the people in

question have no responsibility. I think that this criterion is clearly a version of Popper's negative utilitarianism. I am not here interested in ascertaining the subtle difference between Ichii and Popper concerning the formulation of this principle, because they are obviously on the same camp. I think that Popper viewed the progress of history not only from the moral perspective but also from the ideal of the open society. In this point I think that Ichii's perspective is rather narrower than Popper's. For it seems to me that Ichii concentrated too much on the moral aspects of the history and paid a little attention to the political and economic conditions (mechanisms) under which the people can improve their own society **institutionally**.

However, I think that Ichii's way of thinking has a merit in contrast with Popper's treatment or discussion of the history. I think that concerning the progress of history, that is to say, the improvement of our society Popper mainly asserted and discussed the importance of the piecemeal social engineering, but paid little attention to the role and function of the political intellectuals in the critical situations of the history.

To this problem Ichii presented a theory which is called by him a key-person theory. It is not a hero worship theory. Rather it is a proposed framework to interpret the critical situations of the history. By this theory Ichii tried firstly to criticize the historicist interpretation of the history and secondly to repair the insufficiencies of Popper's social philosophy.

Ichii thought that every turning point of the history is prepared by the preceding objective conditions of the society, but the direction of the history is not completely determined in advance. He thought that it is the initiative (creative subjectivity) of the individual(s) that realizes a certain direction (possibility) of the history. As an example of such a key-person he refers to Ryoma Sakamoto, a famous political leader in the time of collapsing of the Tokugawa regime. This example is very persuasive at least to Japanese people. It is clear that Ichii's key-person theory depends on the logic of situation in Popper's sense. But I believe that key-person theory contributes greatly to the further developments of Popper's social philosophy because it clearly points out the weak point of the piecemeal social engineering in Popper's sense. Here I should quote some sentences from Ichii.

“...the piecemeal way of improving our society does not assure the results automatically, as it were. ...In order to approach to the imagined ideal society step by step, it is

tures. He examines where and how Japanese people accepted/rejected foreign world-views, ideas, thought, and traditions in their history of Japanese literature throughout the 7th or 8th century to the 20th century. He summarizes Japanese indigenous culture as follows:

- (1) The features of the Japanese world-view: Historical transformations in the Japanese world-view have been characterized not so much by the infiltration of various foreign thought systems as by an obstinate clinging to an indigenous attitude and, again and again, the imparting of a Japanese flavor to those systems. The world-view that was emerging in Japan about the fourth and fifth centuries was made up of a complex polytheistic system of belief containing elements of ancestor worship, shamanism and animism.
- (2) The Japanese world-view was neither an abstract nor theoretical view, but tended towards the material and the practical.
- (3) It did not involve a comprehensive philosophical system, but rather a system of customs, which involved special attention being paid to the intrinsic nature of individual phenomena.
- (4) There was no transcendent basic principle.
- (5) *Kami* ('gods') were entities of this world and there was a direct, historical relationship between the age of the gods and the age of humanity.
- (6) Since basic principles were concrete and did not transcend the special conditions for which they were devised, there was no question of any universal system of values that could be defined in terms of transcendental principles.
- (7) This does not mean that there were no individuals who did not possess an absolute sense of values. On the contrary, with heads of special groups frequently holding absolute authority over the groups' members, loyalty became an absolute value, as, for example, in the emperor system.
- (8) Such an authority is valid only within the group and it is evident that this authority does not hold good outside the group.

Then he asked the following question: What happened when this indigenous world-view encountered a highly organized, intellectually sophisticated, transcendental, but foreign, world-view? And he answered:

In some cases the foreign world-view was accepted for itself; in some cases, it was rejected for itself; but in the

majority of cases, the foreign thought system was adopted to Japanese needs. Then,

- (9) The standard form of adaptation can be seen when the foreign thought system was highly organized and sophisticated, as in the cases of Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity and Marxism. Abstract, theoretical aspects were weeded out, the transcendental basic principle was dismantled and only the parts that were valued in terms of practical application were retained. What remained was a 'Japanized' world-view. There was indigenous Japanese thought which remained unchanged through history.

And he points out two characteristics, which are related with each other: Firstly, generally speaking, the degree of integration of individuals into the society to which they belong is very high in Japan. Secondly, the feature of the Japanese indigenous thought is that the world-view does not admit the existence or value that transcends the ordinary reality. And he concludes:

Among the cultural elite, among the literary classes as a whole, and even in the case of some individual writers, foreign thought affected the shallower levels of consciousness and reason, while indigenous thought and feeling affected the deeper levels of emotional life. These shallower and deeper levels corresponded, as it were, to the public and private domains of the individual's life. Thorough integration into a group usually meant that the relationship between the group and its members crossed from the public into the private domain, and it was never easy for foreign thought to penetrate into the depths of emotional life. (p. 10)

These are the very features of tribalism, that is, he concludes that Japan is nothing but a tribal, closed society. But Kato did not explicitly say so. However, according to him, the Japanese have accepted any foreign thoughts which can be compatible with the sacred indigenous tribal ideas in the Japanese society, or have transformed foreign thoughts, which were not compatible with the sacred ideas, and made them compatible with the sacred tribal ideas. Japanese culture was changing drastically all the time but the core was unchanged. This is the core of the Japanese tribalism. In Japan as a marginal culture there remains nothing except racial tribal elements, if you try to find something aboriginal. The Japanese Tenno's system is the typical case. I remember that Levi Strauss came to Japan in 1970's and watched

Japanese traditions and cultures and eventually concluded that Japan is a super-sophisticated tribal society. Kato did not say this but the consequence derived from his remarks is the same as Levi Strauss's conclusion.

III. The Meiji regime reinforced the Japanese closed society

Besides, there is decisive evidence that especially before World War II, Japan was a closed society. That is, it is no doubt that the enforcement of the old criminal law, which includes lese majesty in 1882, had a powerful role of choking any criticism against the Tenno's system. Since then it became a taboo to criticize the monarchy. Incidentally, according to Saburo Ienaga's paper, *The traditions of Republicanism in Japan*, in *Thought* in 1958, before the enforcement of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 almost for twenty years the idea of the Constitution as a republic was born and formed among the liberals, independently from communists or anarchists. At that time, there was another possibility toward an open society. However, because the political leaders who supported the Tenno's system propagated that even liberals, who asserted the democratic movement for the people's rights, were republicans and they were the same as communists or anarchists, in order to find the causes of their suppressions. Then many liberals could not but pretend not to be republicans in order to avoid the suppressions. Finally this democratic movement was oppressed and failed by 1889, as a matter of fact. As a result, under the absolute monarchy, though it was by name the constitutional monarchy, it became impossible for the Japanese to voice their republicanism until 1945. Or rather, by school-education based on the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, the generations after that were decisively influenced and indoctrinated in their minds with the idea of absolute loyalty to the Tenno. As Russell properly points out:

In Japan, it is true, a theory closely similar to Filmer's is held, and must be taught by all professors and school-teachers....Plato is right in thinking that belief in this myth [that is, the dogma that God has created men of three kinds] could be generated in two generations. The Japanese have been taught since 1868 that the Mikado is descended from the sun-goddess, and that Japan was created earlier than the rest of the world. Any university professor, who, even in a learned work, throws doubt on these dogmas, is dismissed for un-Japanese activities.

Soon after this passage, Russell made a good point

against Plato in his saying that what Plato does not seem to realize is that the compulsory acceptance of such myths is incompatible with philosophy, and involves a kind of education which stunts intelligence. I hope philosophy will help in order to make the closed society more open. As a philosophy I have Popper's social philosophy in mind.

In short, Japanese thinkers could not critically examine the Japanese style of monarchy at that time. Again Ienaga clearly pointed out that before 1945 in Japan negative opinions on the monarchy were not allowed, and therefore, it was not allowed even to objectively point out the existence of such opinions to the Japanese.

Therefore, the Japanese society had been a closed society. And I think it still is. You may say Japan was open to other cultures and foreigners, excepting the Tokugawa regime, which definitely closed the door. You may say, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Marxism, Constitutionalism and so on, are all from outside, so Japan was indeed an open society! My answer is "No". I am afraid that one who thinks Japanese society is not a closed society regards the image of the closed society and the members of the closed society as "A frog in the well knows nothing of the great ocean". In this sense Japan is not a closed society. According to Popper, one of the characteristics of the closed society is tribalism based on taboos. There have been indeed taboos on Monarchy.

IV. The opening of the country and the open society

In his paper, *Thought as It Ought to Be*, the late Masao Maruyama, a leading political scientist in post war Japan, says on the present situation in Japan as follows:

Many scholars such as Bergson or Popper make distinction between the open society and the closed society. My word of the octopus trap form of organizations is exchangeable with the word of the closed society but what you have to be cautious in the case of Japan is that Japan as a whole at present is not necessarily the closed society, or rather, is open to the whole world in all directions. Then each group in Japan becomes an octopus trap and each group of an octopus trap is open to outside internationally...You see such a very strange situation in Japan.

I think in the first place he says that Japan is an open society in the sense that a Japanese person is not a frog in the well because he knows the great ocean, but in the latter place he says Japan is the closed society for the members of each group live in a octopus trap, which is a very closed

society. Therefore, Maruyama clearly says that though Japan appears to be an open society, she is really a closed society. In order to express this strange situation, he used the term "octopus trap". He deplores that there is no inter-communication among such groups in Japan. I think this is a problem in a closed society. However, I think the problem of Japanese racial tribalism, which I mentioned earlier, is a bigger problem.

In another paper, *The opening of the Country*, Maruyama claimed that the Japanese had *three* chances to make *their country open, in the Muromachi period, and from the end of Tokugawa period to the Meiji period, and then after World War II*. In his paper he analyzes the situation in Japan since Commodore Perry in 1853, and concludes that Japan could not but open her country but soon closed it, so Japan had still been a closed society until 1945. As Maruyama rightly understands, in the opening of the country there are two sides: to open the country is to open her toward the outside, that is, toward international societies. At the same time, it is to divide her as a nation state from the international societies, that is, the other countries.

Japan was compelled to open her country, so, as a reaction, Japan became nationalistic. As a result, it was regrettable but it was almost historically inevitable for Japan to return to the closed society. Therefore, Popper's idea of the open society and the idea of the opening of the country are related but have to be distinguished. For while the opening of the country can be an external help towards the open society, as a reaction it may make the society closed. Maruyama's insight is valuable and we should keep the distinction of the two concepts in mind. However, Maruyama feels comfortable in Japan as having a highly homogeneous nationality and he seems to me to support such a country. Maruyama says as follows:

The first thing which I feel when I come back to Japan from abroad is that when I get on the train, I observe that almost all the passengers are Japanese!

How did he judge that almost all of them are Japanese? Did he check their passports, which is one of the criteria of identity? Of course, not. For he has no right to check the other's passport. From their appearances? Then this is a terrible racism. From that they speak Japanese? Then how about Koreans, for example, who speak Japanese? Here he will have to choose one of two alternatives, whether he accepts the definition that a Japanese is a person who speaks Japanese or he admits that his judgement was

wrong. But I do not think Maruyama accepts the former definition. For this definition is too narrow in that it excludes children who do not speak Japanese! Then he cannot but to choose that his judgement was wrong. I am afraid Maruyama unconsciously cherishes the stereotyped homogeneous image of Japan, which is regrettably the cause of a biased, wrong, monistic, exclusive tribal nationalism. Or though there is little possibility, does he think that a Korean, who lives in Japan and speaks Japanese, is already Japanese, even if his name is Kim. If so, I agree with him. But I am afraid that the concept of Korean Japanese is unthinkable to him.

Besides he states that the reason why he became a nationalist *soon after* World War II, when most people were against nationalism, is that he was a perverse person. This is a stupid reason and is a pity. Incidentally, Maruyama belongs to the generations after the Imperial Rescript on Education. On the basis of the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education, Japanese homogeneity was artificially formed. For those who belonged to such generations it is very difficult to get rid of the various aspects of ideology from the Tenno's system before World War II. Even he, a liberal, might have been influenced by the ideas of the monistic, exclusive nationalism, derived from the ideology, though, of course, he was publicly opposed to this ideology. In fact, after World War II he became a leading figure for developing democracy and liberalism, and against militarism, ultra-nationalism, or super-nationalism, that is, militarist nationalism. He analyzed the logic and psychology of ultra-nationalism in his paper of the same title in 1946. He has rightly shown that Japanese militarism was not deviation but immanent in the structure of the Japanese state, national polity before World War II.

In prewar Japan people who were opposed to, or even doubted the Tenno system or wars were called un-Japanese, traitors, or betrayers of Japan and were excluded from Japanese society. At last after World War II as a legal institution the right of freedom was formally secured and then we could speak and criticize anything without exception, including the Tenno system. Maruyama did this action soon after World War II. At that time there was a liberal atmosphere. This paper of his has influenced a lot of people then.

Maruyama was a disciple of Shigeru Nanbara. Nanbara was once a liberal president of Tokyo University after World War II and contributed to the peace process after World War II. And Maruyama was one of Herbert Norman's best friends. Norman was a historian on Japan and a diplomat in Canada. There are two episodes on both, that is,

Nanbara and Norman. When Nanbara heard that Japan attacked the United States, he told Maruyama that if the Axis powers won the war, the world would be a disaster. This is a very important suggestion. Norman recommended Maruyama to read and review Popper's *The Open Society* in his letter to Maruyama in 1951. Maruyama accepted his advice and certainly read Popper's book and was influenced by the idea of the open society and wrote two papers, which I mentioned earlier. But he did not write a review of the book. This is regrettable. If he had written a review on Popper's *The Open Society*, Popper's important ideas would have influenced the Japanese people a lot already in the 1950's. This book might have been translated and published at that time. However, in fact, its translation was published in 1973, after the publication of M. Cornforth's *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: a Reply to Dr. Karl Popper's Refutations of Marxism*, whose translation was published in 1972!

V. Prospect

I think it is our task for post war generations, who were educated based on democracy and liberalism, to develop the works of Maruyama, his friends, his followers, and his critics as well, so that Japan will substantially be an open society. Even now most Japanese do not behave democratically, though Japan is formally a democratic country, institutionally and constitutionally. Let me take one example. Maruyama was exalted and deified as a champion of democracy by his disciples, his surroundings and other enthusiastic people and it was difficult to us criticize his theory, even though criticism should be indispensable to democracy. It is ironical. Such deifications happen in many schools of thought. It is said that in each school of thought a leader is set up as a kind of Tenno. This behavior is the contrary to democracy and is a characteristic of the closed society. As it were, Maruyama and his followers live in an octopus trap! This is illustrated by the fact that a lot of critical books on Maruyama's political theory appeared *after* his death.

It is desirable for Japanese to be democrats not by name but in substance. However, it was a pity that our generation had asserted the post war democracy, or more pejoratively, the occupied democracy or a bourgeois democracy was a fallacy and had appealed to a kind of revolution from the end of the 1960's to the 1970's. Contrary to their intentions, their movement produced political reactions. This was an unintended consequence of it. But this is another story.

Maruyama intensively analyzed the situation of pre and post World War II, but did not explicitly analyze it from

the viewpoint of the closed society and the open society, as he did on the periods from the Edo to the Meiji in his paper, *The Opening of the Country*. Nor did he say that throughout history, Japan had been a militarist country and for the first time Japan could rid itself of militarism after World War II because of democracy in Popper's sense. In his stead in the near future I am going to analyze the situation of pre and post World War II from the viewpoint of the closed society and the open society and from Popper's democratic point of view. I hope the *third* attempt of reforming Japan for the more open society will be successful.

A word about reform. It is said that most reforms in Japan are from outside or from above. On the other hand, Popper's idea of the Open Society provides us with reforms from inside or from below. For in each country of the world people can try to reform their country from within. In this context, I think that the idea of political society is very important. For example, I do not belong to the United States nor to Austria. I belong to Japan as a member of the Japanese political society, for I have, for instance, the right to vote. With my friends, who also have such a right, and with people, living in Japan, who do not have such a right, to my regret, we have political power and voices, though we, critical rationalists, are the minorities, to change Japan for the better from within or from below, democratically and peacefully. In this sense of my belonging to the Japanese political society, Japan is a dearest and irreplaceable country to me.



〈一般セッション参加論文〉



IS FIDEISM JUST REDUNDANT FOR CRITICAL RATIONALISM?¹

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1

In chapter 24 of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), Karl Popper (1902-1994) vindicates rationalism, which attaches the greatest importance to arguments and experiences, against irrationalism of emotions and passions. Popper distinguishes two forms of rationalism in western philosophy, that is, comprehensive rationalism, which is likely

¹ I am greatly indebted to discussions with David Miller.

to be “excessive rationalism”, and critical rationalism, which is “modest and self-critical”. The former can be summed up by the attitude “I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience” (Popper 1966b, 230), whereas the latter is typically formulated by the following “*I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.*” (Popper 1966b, 225) If we adopt comprehensive rationalism at all, we are required by skeptics or irrationalists to justify or demonstrate the very principle that any assumption which cannot be justified is to be discarded. According to Popper, it is logically impossible, so comprehensive rationalism would be obliged to fall into self-contradiction, furthering an irrationalist reaction. This predicament of comprehensive rationalism is generalized by William Warren Bartley, III (1934-1990) into the problem of *tu quoque* argument which provides a rational excuse for irrational commitment (Bartley 1984, 72). I will call it the logical problem of the impossibility of justification, though whether it is a genuine logical inconsistency or not is controversial. (See, Miller 1994, 78) On the other hand, a critical rationalist frankly admits that the choice of rationalism against irrationalism results from an act of faith, that is, “faith in reason”, acknowledging the practical, *not logical*, limit of rationalism, that is, “no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude.” (Popper 1966b, 231) Therefore, he need make only that minimum concession to irrationalism, in order to avoid being totally defeated like comprehensive rationalism. Let us consider the following quotation:

A rationalist attitude must first be adopted if any argument or experience is to be effective, and it cannot therefore be based upon argument or experience.... We have to conclude from this that no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude. Thus a comprehensive rationalism is untenable. But, this means that whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be called ‘irrational’. Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational *faith in reason*. So rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained.... The fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith – from faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form of

irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism). (Popper 1966b, 230-1)

Strictly speaking, *the logical problem* of the impossibility of justification, which critical rationalism recognizes, and *the practical one* of the adoption of the critical attitude are completely different, though Popper does not discriminate clearly; this may cause some confusion. In other words, the limit of rationalism issued there can be divided into a negative logical aspect and a practical one. Bartley who advocates comprehensively critical rationalism contributes significantly to the solution of former by separating justification from criticism. Bartley writes:

The classical problem of rationality lay in the fact that, for logical reasons, the attempt to justify everything (or to criticize everything through justification) led to infinite regress or dogmatism. But nothing in logic prevents us from holding everything open to nonjustificational criticism. (Bartley 1984, 123)

However, the solution of the logical problem of rationalism would not mean a practical solution, because one can always refuse to accept arguments whatever they may be, and such an attitude can be carried through without becoming logically inconsistent. (Popper 1966b, 231) Therefore, Popper asserts that rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained, and the critical rationalist, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism (Popper 1966b, 231). In short, there can always exist extreme and violent situations of argument in reality where communication would break down. It is especially important in social and political philosophy to be aware of this perennial possibility. That is the meaning of (the practical) “limit of rationalism” and the frank recognition of it is called “the minimum concession to irrationalism”. (Popper 1966b, 232)

Why is Popper so sensitive to the possibilities of such extreme situations? It is because he knows well from his own experiences during the inter-war period that they are not mere fictions but real occurrences in our history. For example, he writes in the introduction to *The Myth of the Framework*:

It is perhaps of interest if I reveal that I owe the idea

of formulating these two lines [I may be wrong and you may be right / and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth] to a young Carinthian member of the National Socialist Party, neither a soldier nor a policeman, but wearing the Party uniform and a pistol. It must have been not long before the year 1933 – the year Hitler came to power in Germany – that this young man said to me: ‘What, you want to argue? I don’t argue: I shoot!’ He may have planted the seed of my *Open Society*. (Popper 1994, xiii)

In order to show that such situations could easily happen even without any direct resort to physical violence, Popper adduces another example in his seminar:

The Nazis sometimes put out placards inviting people to come to a meeting, and then you would read underneath, written in big letters, “Jews are not invited”, or “Jews are not admitted”, i.e., if a Jew had tried to come to his meeting, he would have been beaten up... So I mean, under those circumstances, they didn’t come to think of arguments which might count! ...there are certain situations where argument does not count – the best argument– even if you could prove it, and I don’t think I can prove to a Nazi that he is doing the wrong thing, by a logical proof or anything like that, which every person listening to a logical argument would have to admit was valid...even if you had proofs, there are limits to it– to the application of the proof. (London School of Economics, Lectures, “Philosophy of the Social Sciences,” Popper Archive, 373.2, 11/5/60)

Thus, according to his view, a rationalist attitude, namely a critical attitude, must precede critical discussions. This insight can be found not only in *The Open Society* but in his philosophy of science since *Logik der Forschung*. He repeatedly insists that what characterizes the scientific approach is a highly critical attitude towards our theories rather than a formal criterion of falsifiability (Popper 1968, 94) Therefore, it is really crucial in his entire philosophy that a critical attitude is prerequisite for the efficacy of logic and critical discussion.

However, Popper’s assertion that the adoption of critical rationalism against irrationalism results from irrational “faith in reason” is rather complicated, so it has been a stumbling block to the understanding of his philosophy especially since it was severely criticized by Bartley as alleged fideism. Now my question is this. What does Popper

really mean by irrational “faith in reason”? And has critical rationalism been superseded by comprehensively critical rationalism?

2

Let us start with Bartley’s criticism of Popper’s alleged fideism. Bartley came to the L.S.E. as a Fulbright student to study with Popper in 1958 after completing his studies at Harvard, and as early as 1960 he, though modestly, criticized Popper’s “faith in reason” (Correspondence from Bartley to Popper, 18th of April, 1960, Popper Archive, 271.24). Bartley objected that “faith in reason” is an unfortunate term because in the Christian literature, it suggests not only something guaranteed, or resting on authority, but also the promise of salvation, though he expressed his agreement with what he took to be Popper’s view that although we hope that the use of reason will help to bring about a better world, we do not regard this as a certainty.

Obviously he interprets “faith in reason” in the religious context which is alien to Popper, even though it is quite understandable if we remember that traditionally, fideism means that religious belief is based on faith and not on evidence or reasoning, being pessimistic about the role of reason. Of course, “faith in reason” in Popper’s sense has nothing to do with any religious faith nor with any pessimism about the role of reason. It is true that Bartley often employed the terminology “fideism” as referring not only to the religious thesis but to the more general philosophical thesis that all our positions, all our opinions, must ultimately be based on our faith or commitment, but nonetheless his criticism of Popper as a fideist seems seriously misleading. Popper has never regarded himself as a fideist, and furthermore, he even maintains that critical rationalism is an answer to fideism. (Artigas 1999, 30) However, after 1960, Bartley’s criticism got more severe partly because of the controversy about the problem of demarcation in 1965, culminating in declaring that fideism is the fatal flaw in Popper’s philosophy. The following is quoted from the 2nd edition of *The Retreat to Commitment* (1984), and was not present in the 1st edition (1962):

Thus in 1960 I discussed these matters with him, and suggested how the problem could be dealt with within the general framework of his own approach, in terms of my distinction between justification and criticism...In response, Popper altered the terminology of chapter 24 of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (fourth and subsequent English editions) to mute his fideism,

and introduce a polemical Addendum on relativism. In *Conjectures and Refutations*, chapter 1, and in his *Realism and the Aim of Science*, part 1, section 2, he introduces my distinction between justification and criticism, and this distinction is now routinely presented as a feature of Popperian thought. Despite these alterations, Popper's earlier fideistic approach has been corrected only in a patchwork manner, dropping some of the old notions, but retaining the old terminology – “critical rationalism” for instance – and the old slogan. This results in a confused situation. (Bartley 1984, 105)

Judging from the corrections in chapter 24 of the fourth edition of *The Open Society* and the insertion of part 1, section 2, of *Realism and the Aim of Science*, Popper evidently accepted at least part of Bartley's criticism, namely, the distinction of positive justification and negative criticism and nonjustificational criticism, though Popper thought of such corrections and insertions as mere clarifications of his philosophy, rather than substantive changes:

I discussed this chapter [chapter 24 of *The Open Society*] very often and very extensively with Bartley, from 1959 on and since he criticized some of my formulations, I made some significant alterations to one of its pages (II, p.231) in the fourth English edition of 1962. These alterations were suggested by him, and I acknowledged them in a new *addendum* to that edition (see II, p.369) ...I *do* think that the altered passages on that page (II, p.231) were clarified. That the matter is one of *clarification* rather than of any real *change* of my views may be seen by anybody who reads ch.24 carefully and who compares the pages 231 of vol.II in the fourth English edition and in the preceding (third and second) editions, of 1957 and 1952.(Popper 1968, 97)

In fact, when comparing them to ascertain whether his alterations are only clarifications or real changes, certainly the altered passages on that page sound less justificationist using words such as “may” or “tentative”, but the crucial phrase “irrational *faith in reason*” remains unchanged.

“Whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because without reasoning he has adopted some decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called irrational. Whatever it may be, we

can describe it as an irrational *faith in reason*. Rationalism is therefore far from comprehensive or self-contained. (Popper 1945b, 218. The underlining is mine.)

In my opinion, in contrast to what Bartley says, it is natural that Popper consciously left the unchanged phrase “irrational *faith in reason*”, and did not make alterations “in a patchwork manner”. In other words, even after being criticized by Bartley, Popper still retained both “irrational *faith in reason*” and nonjustificationism, the principle of which can be summarized in “nothing is exempt from criticism” or “everything is open to criticism.” Why? I think it is concerned with the above two aspects of the limit of rationalism, that is, the logical limit, namely, *tu quoque* argument, and the practical limit. The former has been solved by Popper with the great aid of Bartley, but Popper believes that the latter has not been and will not be conclusively resolved. Therefore, he proposes some normative methodologies both in natural and political science in order to deal with the practical problems.

Popper asserts that the choice between critical rationalism and irrationalism before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste, but a fundamental moral decision, which will deeply affect our whole attitude towards other people, and towards the problems of social life. (Popper 1966b, 232) As I see it, our “faith in reason” – not only a faith in our own reason, but also in that of others (Popper 1966b, 238) – would play a pivotal role as an ethical regulative idea in our making such moral decisions. However, our “faith in reason” is not necessarily “irrational” because, as Popper tries to show, it has proved its mettle through our history. Thus, it might be better to call it “*arational*” in the sense that it should precede critical discussions, rather than “irrational” which may be easily misunderstood. To sum up, the ideas of “faith in reason” and of fallibility which lead us to a critical attitude and to toleration as well as the idea of truth can form the fundamental ethical basis of critical rationalism.

Incidentally, even if we assume the dualism of facts and norms spelled out in Chapter 5 of *The Open Society*, we need not fall into moral relativism, because our moral decisions are far from arbitrary. We do not make moral decisions in a vacuum, but in actual situations which can be analyzed in many ways. We can investigate our situation before making decisions, for example by analyzing carefully the consequences that are likely to result from the alternatives which we have to choose between (Popper 1966b, 232),

though such investigations themselves cannot determine them. Popper explains as following:

...in any moral decision we have of course to consider all the consequences which we can possibly foresee of this decision and the question how much we can foresee and the question of what will be the consequences, that is to say factual predictions, are very important in our decisions..., but there is also no doubt that they have to be distinguished from the moral decision itself. (London School of Economics, Lectures, "Philosophy of the Social Sciences," Popper Archive, 373.2,18/5/60, p.11)

Accordingly, Popper is very critical of those who indulge in discussing highly abstract problems of moral philosophy without having their own concrete problems. What are important are actual moral and social problems, not pedantic problems of moral and social philosophy. (See his negative utilitarianism)

Turning now to comparing the consequences resulting from critical rationalism and irrationalism, the former is inevitably lead to the position embracing such moral values as freedom, justice and tolerance, which human beings have discovered and deepened by trial and error; the latter is lead to the position which is one of scorn for human reason, leading to an appeal to violence as the ultimate arbiter in any dispute. (Popper 1966b, 234) In a word, critical rationalism is lead to humanitarianism, whereas irrationalism is associated with the anti-equalitarian and anti-humanitarian attitude. (Popper 1966b, 240) Furthermore, critical rationalism is tied up with our creativity and world 3 which consists of the products of the human mind, because a critical attitude can be said to be the intersection of world 2 and world 3. Therefore, the choice between critical rationalism and irrationalism could be said to correspond to that between the Open Society and the Closed Society.

3

As Popper emphasizes, it is very important to bear in mind that critical rationalism is not a philosophical thesis, but an attitude of readiness to listen to critical discussions and to learn from our mistakes, namely, of admitting that '*I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.*'. In brief, it is *a way of living* tied up with fallibilism, which means that critical rationalists must prove themselves in deeds. In fact, though Popper tries to explain it laboriously in a simple way, the critical

attitude cannot be generally formulated in the form of a sentence, a thesis or a definition, because the practical problem of "what should I do?", or "How should I adopt the critical attitude?" is a particular one, which largely depends on actual situations and each subject. Obviously, there are not any universal rules, manuals, or algorithms as to the critical attitude, so we should try to find by ourselves our own way of adopting the critical attitude by trial and error in actual situations.

It is very suggestive that Popper makes the distinction between 'adopting' and 'trying' in his comments in Kyoto, 1992, because it means that adopting the critical attitude is a terribly difficult task which will demand of us a self-cultivation and self-discipline extending over a long period of time, learning from trial and error. Clearly, people cannot often adopt a sufficiently critical attitude in actual situations. Thus, if we want to adopt the critical attitude, we should not merely understand it in our brain, but try it again and again in reality, gradually forming our own critical approach. From this point of view, we can think of Popper's general schema of problem-solving as our learning process for the critical attitude.

P1(problem) → TT(tentative theory) → EE(error-elimination) → P2(new problem)

As Popper maintains that we can transcend our instinctive desires and inclinations, namely ourselves, by means of trial and error, our critical problem-solving in daily life may lead to the cultivation and enhancement of our critical attitude. In brief, from a static point of view, the adoption of a critical attitude *results from* the consequences of *continual* individual moral decisions, whereas from a dynamic point of view, it *results in* the *continuous* process of our self-transcendence. Accordingly, it turns out that the choice between critical rationalism and irrationalism is not a simple, one-off moral decision by which we acquire the lifelong commitment. Rather, we always confront such choices consciously or unconsciously, which means that we might fall into irrationalism. Therefore, the practical limit of rationalism, namely, the problem of the adoption of critical attitude does also come up.

If we admit Popper's contention that we cannot formulate the critical attitude in the form of any philosophical thesis and only show it in our deeds, the refinement and elaboration of critical rationalism, such as comprehensively critical rationalism, which seems considerably abstract, may be *a double-edged sword* which might undermine critical ration-

alism. In *The Myth of the Framework*, Popper clearly criticizes the controversy about comprehensively critical rationalism.

There also was an attempt to replace my critical rationalism by a more radically critical and more explicitly defined position. But because this attempt bore the character of a definition, it led to endless philosophical arguments about its adequacy. (Popper 1994, xii)

In conclusion, let us now return to the original question, "Is fideism just redundant for critical rationalism?" Answer: fideism in Bartley's sense is just misleading, but Popper's arational "faith in reason" plays a crucial role as the fundamental ethical idea in critical rationalism. To my way of thinking, the practical problem of rationalism should be dealt with in both static and dynamic way, including democratic institutions to protect freedom of criticism and thought, *and the tradition of the critical discussion. Popper regarded* the adoption of a critical attitude as a task that demands of every person immediate action here and now and always, and he himself struggled to make critical rationalism a living idea.

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Section 4: Moral & political philosophy

SURREPTITIOUS CHANGES IN JAPAN: AN EXAMPLE

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I. Surreptitious Changes

In October 2000, Professor Joseph Agassi and Dr. Judith Buber Agassi came to Japan and gave us several lectures, deeply moving audiences in Kyoto, Akita and Tokyo. During this time, as a guest of the Japan Popper Society Professor Joseph Agassi gave a lecture in Keio University, Tokyo, on *Popper's Political Philosophy in the Perspective of Global Politics*.

In this lecture he emphasized the importance of Popper's idea that surreptitious changes were wrong. For if we do not face any mistakes of our assertions which were pointed out by criticism but change the original assertions surreptitiously, we cannot learn from our mistakes and modify them correctly. This suggested to me that it is worthwhile to write a book on the surreptitious changes in Japan by which we are going to make a Japanese society be more open, more democratic, more liberal, and more egalitarian. In Popper's idea of democracy, freedom, equality, and mutual help can be compatible with one another.

As far as I know Popper uses the words, surreptitious changes or surreptitious alterations only in two places in his books, one in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* and the other in *Conjectures and Refutations*. Popper's argument against surreptitious changes in his *Logic* is too technical. In order to explain this, I should first explain falsificationism, conventionalism, and conventionalist stratagem. Thus, here in this paper I will explain his idea against surreptitious changes in his *Conjectures and Refutations*.

Popper says almost all schools, except the Ionian School from Thales, Anaximander, to Anaximenes, are founded on the same task, that is, the task to impart a definite doctrine, and to preserve it, pure and unchanged. It is the task of a school to hand on the tradition, the doctrine of its founder, its master, to the next generation, and to this end the most important thing is to keep the doctrine intact. Then he says:

In this way all changes of doctrine – if any – cannot but be *surreptitious changes*. They are all presented as re-statements of the true sayings of the master, of his own words, his own meaning, his own intentions. Let us call such a tradition “The authoritarian Tradition”.

On the other hand, the Ionian school founded the tradition that allows or encourages critical discussions between various schools and, even within one and the same school. This was the first of “The Critical Tradition”. This spirit of respecting criticism was clearly expressed in Plato’s *Gorgias*.

According to Popper, we are fallible and all of us make mistakes, but we can learn from our mistakes. His respect for criticism or mutual criticism is based on fallibilism. Now, in order to find mistakes we need criticism and refutations. In order to learn from our mistakes, we accept refutations as refutations, and try to correct our former views, and try to approach the truth as a regulative idea gradually, by correcting the previous mistakes.

To allow surreptitious changes is to make the power of criticism weak or helpless. Therefore, to respect criticism or more exactly speaking, to respect refutations the idea against surreptitious changes is indispensable. For if one changes his ideas surreptitiously, he can make an impression that his ideas were not refuted and he can dodge refutations. An example of surreptitious change is this: while saying that your criticisms or refutations of my view were based on misunderstandings, so your criticisms were not so important, I change the meaning and intentions of my view surreptitiously and can make others believe that I meet refutations and my view is not refuted. Therefore, the idea against surreptitious changes is critically important to criticisms and refutations.

Popper’s idea against surreptitious changes is very useful both in the philosophy of science and social philosophy. And I am going to use this idea in the various political matters in Japan. The following is one of many examples.

II. From Militarists to Democrats: An example of Surreptitious Changes in Japan

There are a lot of surreptitious changes in modern Japanese history. What I have in mind are as follows: From Militarists to Democrats; From Militarists to Marxists; Politicians of War Criminals Returned to the Political World; The Processes of Rearmament; The Red Purge; From Marxists to Militarists; Surreptitious Changes among Some

Critics on Politics and Economics, etc.

Here I take up only one example, that is, from militarists to democrats. The war ended and Japan’s post war began as the result of so-called unconditional surrender. Just before the unconditional surrender (almost) all Japanese were militarists or enforced to be militarists by the order from the above. This fact is exemplified by a well-known government’s official policy in the time of war, “*Ichoku-So-Gyokusai*”, which means that the total one hundred million Japanese are ready to accept to die but never surrender. They tried to continue the war with an illusion of taking perfect triumph in the final battle in the main land of Japan, Japan’s four islands. This idea is fanaticism and is based on literally suicidal acts. This idea is neither a sign of nationalism, nor patriotism, though it appears to be so. This is nothing but nihilism. They tried to choose the way of complete annihilation. If all Japanese had died, nothing would have remained. In war the motto of death and no surrender may regrettably have a sense in a limited scope, but it can never be applied to all of Japanese people. The US and all other countries outside Japan feared that this would take place in Japan.

It was miserable and painful but nevertheless fortunately the war ended before complete annihilation. Japan surrendered on the 15th of August 1945. Just after the war in his letter to Saburo Kurusu, dated 27 August 1945, Shigeru Yoshida frankly told that defeat was not necessarily bad. There might have been quite a lot of Japanese people who felt the same.

Just after the surrender they changed their idea of death and no surrender to the idea of “*Ichoku-So-Zange*”, which means that the total one hundred million Japanese apologized. Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni officially expressed this idea in a speech on his administrative policies in the diet, the 28th of August 1945.

And the Japanese immediately accepted democracy and welcomed MacArthur’s occupation policies. As it were, they went to bed as militarists and awoke next morning as democrats. In his book, *The Lotus and the Robot*, Arthur Koestler depicts this drastic change with wonder, though he does not use the term of democracy.

The undefeated armies overseas, whose standing orders had been death before surrender, peacefully yielded up their arms at the Emperor’s radioed order; there was no fighting on the beaches and no fighting in the streets, and no attempt to ‘repel the Barbarian invader with bamboo spears’. The most ferociously warlike foe turned overnight into the most

peaceful and affable population with an occupation army ever had to deal with.

He tries to understand this almost unbelievable event by appealing to the Japanese traditional values of “chu” which means “unconditional loyalty to the head of the social hierarchy” and “ko” which means “the loyalty due to parents and ancestors”. And he points out that chu was the First Commandment of Japanese ethics and ko was the Second and all other rules of conduct came lower down in the list. Then he claims as follows:

The dramatic change which, on 14 August 1945, transformed the nation overnight from a tiger into a lamb was thus, paradoxically, a proof of its basically unchanged character; it showed that, in spite of revolutions and reforms, the traditional code of feudal ethics had never lost its hold; that the ancient pattern had survived underneath the imported, prefabricated superstructure.

Koestler’s analysis is very interesting and may be true as an analysis of the situation at that time, especially for the steps done by the Japanese at once when they heard the Tenno’s order from the radio. However, if we accept his analysis, we have to conclude that the Japanese people did not change at all, and even surreptitious changes did not exist in Japan. I think once a new policy or a new institution is introduced, people who are under such a policy or institution will change their ideas and conducts even a little bit. Japanese are not exception. I hope Japanese changed or are changing, or will change their ideas and conducts after World War II, not that they would not change them at all. Apparently they accepted democracy, which did not exist at all in Prewar Japan, even though there was a democratic tendency for a short period. At least nowadays quite a few Japanese do not obey the rules of conduct, chu and ko, and some do not even know what chu and ko are. Accordingly I want to proceed my study on the basis that Japanese changed their ideas and conducts, even though they might have changed them surreptitiously.

Then, did they know what democracy was? Did they regard that democracy was important? Did the Japanese reflect and apologize? If one confesses that he was once a militarist and it was wrong and now he is a democrat, then his change is not a surreptitious change. But I do not think that most of them did reflect and apologize. Or rather, I am afraid they may say they were democrats from the past and were victims of militarism.

On the other hand, some may say all the Japanese apologized, as the saying, “Ichioku-So-Zange”, the total one hundred million Japanese apologized, shows this fact. It may be said, therefore, my assertion that they did not apologize was decisively refuted.

I do not think my assertion was refuted. My position is subtle. Either by surreptitious change of my idea I myself will avoid the refutation or I will admit my mistakes. I will not take either way.

III. Two Senses of Apology

Let me explain my position. I think there are at least two senses in apology. In one sense the Japanese apologized, but in another sense they did not apologize. In ordinary life a Japanese person often says, “I am sorry. I made a mistake,” when he is *scolded* by another. Apparently this attitude is like a Popperian one. However, this is not true. You will understand that this is not true from a simple question. “In what point do you think you made a mistake?” There will be no answer. The person who apologizes thinks that not he himself but the person who scolded him should indicate the point of mistake. He himself does not reflect and does not look for the cause of his mistake. I think the reason the Japanese apologize is that they want to be forgiven and to say sorry means to beg pardon. Once he is forgiven, he forgets everything he did. By the expression of apology itself the faults of his deeds in the past are washed away. There is a Japanese saying, “Misogi wo shite subete wo mizu ni nagasu”. Misogi means Japanese ablutions, this means to take ablution and let bygones be bygones, or to be forgiven and forget, not forgive and forget. Apology is only a means to be forgiven by, to win pardon, and to return to the original state. They lost the war and surrendered, and apologized because they were defeated and lost. The reason for their apology was to return to the original state as before. If they had not lost the war, they would not have reflected, though they had made a lot of mistakes.

On the other hand, apology in another sense, which I respect highly and the Japanese did not do, is this. When you say, “I am sorry. I made a mistake,” there are at least five conditions for this apology to be an apology in the second sense. Firstly, apology must be based on sincerity, not pretension. Secondly, you can say concretely in what point you made a mistake. Third, not to forget the mistake. Fourth, to learn from the mistake and try to correct it. Fifth, to be responsible for your mistakes and your attempted solutions.

The apology of “Ichioku-So-Zange” lacks the above-mentioned conditions. Therefore, I say they did not apolo-

間の離婚原因は婚姻関係が要求する倫理規範の意味するところについての見解の不一致であり、ポパーの方法論に基づいて倫理規範を検証し、遂行不可能な規範を除去していくことで離婚は減少するだろうとのことである。テーマ設定の独創性にも驚かされたが、そうした応用の仕方が、アメリカ社会の道徳的紐帯の喪失感を指摘した R.ベラー (『心の習慣』) の議論を想起させた。

ポパーと共同体主義を前者の側に立ちながら対比させて論じた Stelzer(Austria) は、ヨーロッパには自由が行き過ぎて社会の求心力が低下していることへの危機感があると話していた。もちろん、初めに挙げた Lewanska や Harte へのフロアからのコメントには、ポパーの意図はいたずらに感情に訴えかけることを戒めるものであるとし、個人主義や理性への信頼の意義を確認する意見も出た。また、発表の中では Stokes(Australia)の Karl Popper's Revisionist Theory of Democracy と題した、ポパー的な漸進的改良主義の民主主義を評価する分析が、そうした合理主義者たることの意義を説得力を持って論じていて共感するところが多かった (ただ、民主主義に参加する市民を育成する教育の重要性を論者が強調したため、注入教育はポパーの考えと矛盾するのではないかという質問が——やはり——出た)。よって、全体としては多様な見解があったのではあるが、近年のヨーロッパにおける理性や個人主義を再検討する傾向の中で、ポパー研究もその例外ではないように感じられたことが、今回強く印象に残った。

もっとも、それぞれの地域の事情が反映されるのはヨーロッパに限ったことではなく、例えば Croatia の Kurelic は、多文化主義の相対主義的主張が行う自由主義批判とファイヤーベントのポパー批判とを並列させ、それぞれ後者を擁護する議論で、当然背景に民族の共存という問題を抱えている。一方で台湾の Jeu-Jenq Yuann はファイヤーベントの「開かれた社会のドグマティズム化批判」側に立つ発表を行ったが、後のパーティの際に聞いた話では、その発表は自分が台湾人であることと繋がっているということであった (結論が、ではなく問題関心がという意味で言っていたのだと思う)。

日本ポパー学会の発表はこうした地域性を正面から打ち出したスペシャルプログラムだったが、Agassi の発表時間と重なってしまって少数精鋭の聴衆の中で行われることになった。質問は、発表に関連して戦後日本の経済・社会的変化と精神的変化それぞれに及び、日本への関心の所在が如何様なものか知ることができた。フィリピンや台湾からの参加者が「日本ポパー学会のホームページを見ている」と話しかけてきてくれ

とが嬉しかった。全五日の日程を通じ、ポパーを通じて世界が広がることを実感した貴重な体験であった。



Karl Popper 2002 Centenary Congress に参加して

松元 雅和

7月3日から五日間、指導教授からのお誘いがあったウィーン大学で開催されたカール・ポパーの生誕 100 周年大会に参加した。プログラムから推察できたように、ヨーロッパだけではなく東欧やアジア、アフリカの研究者の参加も多数あり、ポパー哲学が世界の様々なところで広く読まれ、問題関心が広く共有されているということを認識できた。著名な学者同士が互いに批判的な応答をかわす場面も多く、ポパーの現代的・実践的意義を考え続けようという意識が参加者に共有されていることが感じられた。本報告では、五日間を通じて、筆者が特に関心をもって参加したセッション (七つに分けられていたが、そのなかの「道徳・政治哲学」のセッションにメインに出席した) について振り返ってみたい。

マレーシアのマラヤ大学 Murad 氏による「ポパーの科学哲学と現代政治・社会・文化におけるその含意」という発表があった。その内容は次のようなものである。ポパーは自らの科学方法論を政治哲学の領野に応用しようとしたが、果たしてこの試み自体はどのように評価されるのか。発表者によれば、それは近代「啓蒙」思想運動の一環として考えることができ、理性・合理性と人間性への根本的な信頼 (科学ではなく) が、ポパーの上のような応用に向かわせたと発表者は主張する。現代社会において科学的思考が果たしている役割の重要性の現実、言い換えれば「理性という文化」がポパーの著作のなかで析出されよう、というのがポパーとローティとを比較しながらの論者の結論であった。質疑応答では氏のポパー解釈・ローティ解釈に質問が集中したが、個人的には、非西洋の文脈からこのようにポパーの議論を論ずるときそれをどのように評価できるのか、もう少し詳しいお話を伺いたいところだった。

他にポパーにおける理性の役割を政治理論的に考察したものとして、カール・ポパー・インスティテュートの Kadlec 氏による「ポパーの消極的功利主義とその批判者」という発表があり、そこでは古典的功利主義に代えて苦痛・苦患・不正の問題に対応することを政治的に要求するポパーのピースミール社会学がと

